# World Watch

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Why Gulf Countries Now Want Iran Inside Their Security Framework From Rivalry to Recalibration: Why Gulf States Are Rethinking Iran For decades, the Gulf monarchies leaned almost entirely on Washington for security while treating Iran as the region's chief threat. That calculus first cracked after the 2019 Abqaiq attack showed the US wouldn't always respond, then shattered in February 2026, when a US-Israeli campaign against Iran drew missile and drone strikes on Saudi energy sites, US bases in Bahrain and Qatar, and Kuwaiti and Emirati infrastructure. Six months into that war, Qatar's prime minister called the conflict a "wake-up call," saying Gulf states and Iran must build a security framework together because Iran, as he put it, is a permanent neighbor. The rapprochement Saudi Arabia struck with Iran back in 2023, brokered by China, now looks less like an isolated deal and more like the opening move in a much broader recalibration that the war forced into the open. What a Framework Could Look Like Doha's proposal rests on four pillars: sovereignty, non-aggression, confidence-building and dialogue, sitting alongside existing alliances rather than replacing them outright. Analysts have floated ideas ranging from mutual nuclear inspections built on the Gulf states' own emerging civilian programs, to a standing consultative body linking the six GCC states with Iran, to hotlines and deconfliction channels modeled on the one Washington and Tehran quietly set up during the war. Iran's foreign minister has echoed the call for a regional mechanism, though with a pointed condition: it should come "without the presence or interference of any country from outside the region," a line Gulf capitals are unlikely to accept given how much they still depend on US airpower and interceptors. Investment is part of the picture too, with Gulf officials describing tens of billions of dollars in potential commercial ties meant to give Tehran an economic stake in calm rather than confrontation. Key Drivers Behind the Shift Several forces are pushing this along at once. The most immediate is sheer exposure: thousands of Iranian strikes hit GCC territory during the war, proving that hosting American bases makes a country a target rather than shielding it. Closely tied to that is a deepening doubt about Washington's reliability, a doubt that started with the muted US response to Abqaiq in 2019 and hardened further when American interceptor stocks ran short mid-war, leaving Gulf air defenses stretched thin. Economic self-interest matters just as much. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have poured trillions of dollars into diversification plans like Vision 2030, Ras Al Khaimah's tourism push and Qatar's LNG expansion, and none of that ambition survives if the Strait of Hormuz keeps closing and reopening on Iran's terms, spooking investors and insurers alike. Obstacles Still in the Way None of this comes easily. Iran's missile and drone arsenal, its nuclear program, and its ties to armed groups like the Houthis remain core Gulf concerns that goodwill and communiques alone won't resolve. GCC states don't fully agree among themselves either: the UAE leaned toward deeper Israeli security cooperation during the war, Qatar pushed mediation and quiet diplomacy with Tehran, and Saudi Arabia hedged by deepening defense ties with Pakistan and Turkey, signing a mutual defense pact in Mecca in August. Regional institutions remain thin compared with the task at hand, past ceasefires have collapsed within weeks of being announced, and decades of mistrust built through proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon won't dissolve simply because leaders have started using the word dialogue more often. What It Could Mean for Regional Stability If a framework takes hold, even a loose or partial one, it could lower the odds of miscalculation, keep the Strait of Hormuz open more reliably, and give Gulf states room to keep building their post-oil economies without the constant threat of another missile barrage. If it doesn't, the region risks lurching from one fragile truce to the next, much as it has for most of 2026, with energy infrastructure, desalination plants and shipping lanes as the recurring casualties. Either outcome matters well beyond the Gulf itself, since a fifth of the world's oil and a large share of its liquefied natural gas pass through those waters. What's changed is the premise: Gulf capitals are now openly arguing they can't simply rent their security from outside powers, and that alone marks a real break from the last fifty years, whatever ultimately becomes of the framework itself. Sources https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/8/29/six-months-into-the-iran-war-a-new-gulf-security-architecture-is-emerging https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48971 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/new-order-gulf Related video "Ceasefire's Chokepoint – What Will It Take to Re-Open the Strait of Hormuz?" (MECGA panel with Kabir Taneja, Camille Lons, Ali Bakir, Hana Elshehaby) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0Cq9EJp5Q8