# Geopolitical Trends

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Red Sea Shipping Attacks and Maritime Chokepoint Security: Why It Matters for Trade and Energy Costs Since late 2023, Yemen's Houthi movement has attacked commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, citing the Israel-Gaza war. The result is the most sustained disruption to a major trade artery since the Suez Canal's 1967–75 closure. This explainer looks at how resilient global shipping has proven, and what naval responses have and haven't achieved. Why This Chokepoint Matters The Suez–Red Sea–Bab-el-Mandeb corridor links Asian and Middle Eastern production with European and North American consumers. The IMO estimates roughly a quarter of global shipping normally uses it; UNCTAD puts it at 12–15% of world trade by some measures. EIA data show crude oil and petroleum liquids transiting Bab-el-Mandeb near 9 million barrels a day pre-crisis, alongside most seaborne LNG bound for Europe. How the Crisis Unfolded Nov. 2023–2025: MARAD counted over 100 Houthi attacks affecting more than 60 nations, sinking several vessels and killing multiple seafarers. Oct. 2025: A U.S.-brokered Gaza ceasefire led the Houthis to pause attacks on shipping. 2026: Attacks resumed after the Houthis re-engaged following the outbreak of fighting between Israel, the U.S., and Iran in February 2026, contributing to oil prices moving back above $100 a barrel. How Resilient Is Global Shipping? Short term: highly adaptive. Within weeks, major carriers (Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd) rerouted around Africa's Cape of Good Hope rather than risk crews and cargo. No critical shortages resulted — the industry absorbed cost and time instead. What the reroute costs: Time and fuel: Cape diversions add roughly 10–15 days and can extend Asia–Europe transits substantially; round-trip fuel use and emissions rise by around 70%. Effective capacity: UNCTAD reports rerouting pushed global ton-miles up a record ~6% in 2024, nearly three times trade-volume growth — the same cargo now consumes more vessel-days, tightening capacity without demand growth. Freight rates and premiums: Container spot rates spiked sharply early on (UNCTAD documented more than a doubling on Shanghai–Europe routes within weeks), and war-risk insurance premiums for Red Sea transits rose well above pre-crisis levels. Suez Canal traffic: The Suez Canal Authority recorded 12,758 vessel transits in 2025 versus 13,213 in 2024 — a partial, uneven recovery still far below 2023 norms; UNCTAD put tonnage roughly 70% below 2023 levels as of mid-2025. Medium term: Where strain accumulates. The industry's flexibility masks slower-building costs: Schedule reliability deteriorates first, as longer, more variable routes make on-time arrivals harder to predict. Equipment and vessel imbalances follow, as containers and ships end up positioned for the wrong direction of trade, requiring costly repositioning. Inventory and working capital costs rise as importers hold larger buffer stocks against delay — a slower-moving but persistent driver of higher landed costs and, at the margin, consumer price pressure. Port congestion at hub ports has increased waiting times, per UNCTAD. A sudden normalization could strand capacity added to cover longer routes, risking an oversupplied fleet. Overall: Global shipping has proven resilient in that goods keep moving and no chokepoint has fully closed — but resilience has come through steady added cost, time, and lower reliability, not through avoidance of disruption. Naval and Security Responses Several coalition and industry measures have been deployed: Operation Prosperity Guardian (U.S.-led, Dec. 2023): Multinational escort and patrol coalition, later paired with U.S.-UK "deter and degrade" airstrikes on Houthi military targets. EU Operation Aspides (March 2024): A defensively mandated EU naval mission providing escorts and air/missile defense for merchant shipping, without strikes ashore. Industry self-protection: convoying, adherence to the industry's Best Management Practices (BMP) guidance, armed private security teams, and rerouting or transponder adjustments. What these achieved: Escorts and missile defense intercepted many drone and missile attacks, likely preventing further casualties and losses. Airstrikes degraded some Houthi weapons stocks and launch sites. Limitations, per independent reviews including a Dutch government evaluation: Neither coalition addressed the underlying driver — Houthi capability and intent — so neither stopped attacks outright. Too few escort vessels covered all commercial traffic in the corridor. Aspides' defensive-only mandate left it reactive, unable to deter through the threat of retaliation. European states largely declined to join U.S.-UK strikes, preferring the separate Aspides mission to avoid escalation with Iran — diluting the pooled naval assets originally intended for Prosperity Guardian, analysts note. The clearest reduction in attacks came from the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire, not military pressure — underscoring that the crisis is tied to the broader political conflict, not purely a maritime-security problem. Conclusion The Red Sea crisis shows global trade can withstand losing a major chokepoint for an extended period through rerouting — at the price of higher costs, longer lead times, and less schedule reliability, not outright shortages. Naval coalitions have improved protection for individual ships but haven't ended attacks through military means alone; that has depended more on the wider regional conflict. With attacks resuming in 2026 amid renewed regional tensions, the corridor's status remains unsettled. Sources UNCTAD — Review of Maritime Transport 2025: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025_en.pdf UNCTAD — Maritime trade under pressure, 2025 outlook: https://unctad.org/news/maritime-trade-under-pressure-growth-set-stall-2025 UNCTAD — Navigating troubled waters (2024): https://unctad.org/publication/navigating-troubled-waters-impact-global-trade-disruption-shipping-routes-red-sea-black U.S. EIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints: https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints MARAD Advisory 2026-006 (Houthi attacks): https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-006-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-and-somali-basin-houthi-attacks Security Council Report — The Red Sea, July 2026: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-07/the-red-sea.php Netherlands IOB — evaluation of Dutch contributions to Red Sea security: https://english.iob-evaluatie.nl/results/dutch-contributions-to-the-red-sea CIMSEC — Aspides and the EU's aspirations for sea control: https://cimsec.org/with-the-shield-or-on-it-aspides-and-the-eu-aspirations-for-sea-control/