# Conflict Zone

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THE ECONOMIC FRONT: RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR'S IMPACT ON BOTH ECONOMIES More than four years after Russia's February 2022 invasion, both economies remain reshaped by war. Ukraine faces destruction, displacement, and aid dependency; Russia has absorbed sanctions through wartime spending and energy exports, though momentum is fading. This summary draws on IMF, World Bank, UN, and central bank data, distinguishing confirmed figures from projections. UKRAINE GDP: Ukraine's economy shrank roughly 30% in 2022. Growth slowed to 3.2% in 2024 (World Bank) and is projected at 2% for 2025, down from an earlier 6.5% forecast, as war affects investment. Nominal GDP was about $214 billion in 2025. Inflation & currency: Inflation hit 12.9% y/y in January 2025 (IMF), driven by food and labor costs. The hryvnia has been progressively devalued, moving toward roughly 45 per dollar under 2025 budget planning. Government finances: The 2026 budget allocates 2.8 trillion hryvnia ($66.4bn) to defense (~27.2% of GDP). The 2026 deficit is projected at 18.4% of GDP (~$41.5bn); 2025's public sector deficit rose above 25% of GDP. Ukraine has received $153 billion in direct budget support from partners since 2022. Public debt is projected to reach 106% of GDP ($240bn) by end-2026. Trade: Export value fell nearly 5% in H1 2025 amid weaker shipments to the EU (60% of exports). Ukraine expects a $40-45bn trade deficit for 2025-26. Reconstruction: The February 2026 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5) put reconstruction costs at almost $588 billion over the next decade — about three times 2025 GDP. An earlier assessment (Feb. 2025) found direct damages of over $176bn as of December 2024, with 13% of housing stock (2.5 million homes) damaged or destroyed. Labor & poverty: War has pushed over 8 million Ukrainians into poverty. The Ministry of Economy projects a need for 5 million additional workers for reconstruction. About 20% of working-age displaced people/returnees are unemployed, vs. 11% among non-displaced residents. Displacement: UNHCR counts 5.86 million refugees abroad (5.3 million in Europe) and 3.7 million internally displaced (73% for over two years); 10.8 million need humanitarian assistance in 2026. Employment among Ukrainian refugees in Germany is ~39% for ages 20-64, less than half the national rate, with wages 50% lower. Across Europe, 57% of refugees are employed, 22 points below host nationals. RUSSIA GDP: After growth above 4% in 2023-2024 fueled by military spending, 2025 marked the end of that spurt, with growth slowing toward 1% or lower. IMF forecasts 0.6% (2025) and 1.0% (2026); Russia's Economic Development Ministry later cut its 2026 forecast to 0.4%. Inflation & rates: The central bank raised its key rate to 21% in September 2024 to fight war-driven inflation, then eased gradually — to 14.25% by June 19, 2026 — as inflation fell to 5.6% (still above the 4% target). Rates are expected to average 14.1% in 2026, easing to 9% by 2028. Government spending: Spending is projected at 42.3 trillion rubles ($528.8bn) in 2025 and 44.1 trillion ($551.3bn) in 2026. 2025 revenue fell short of plan for the first time since the pandemic. Deficits are forecast at 2.6% of GDP (2026), narrowing to 1.5% by 2028. VAT rises from 20% to 22% on January 1, 2026, to help close the gap. Energy & sanctions: Oil and gas revenue fell over 25% in 2025 amid ruble appreciation and sanctions; 2025 revenue was projected at $108.8bn, below the planned $136.3bn. Enforcement remains imperfect: fossil-fuel export revenue rose to €726m/day in May 2026, with India, China, and Turkey as main buyers; nearly half of seaborne oil moves via sanctioned "shadow" tankers. Frozen assets: The G7-led REPO Task Force estimates $280bn in frozen Russian reserves (many estimates run $300-330bn), with roughly $200bn managed via Euroclear in Belgium. The UK government estimates sanctions have denied Russia at least $450bn in access since 2022, including $285bn in immobilized central bank reserves. Labor market: Unemployment remains at record lows despite slowing growth, reflecting wartime mobilization and demographic constraints; nominal wage growth is expected to slow to 9.5% in 2026 while real wages still rise. COMPARISON Ukraine has suffered massive direct destruction and runs deficits of 18-25% of GDP financed almost entirely by foreign partners; war has affected 41% of its population, and defense spending equals roughly a third of GDP. Russia has avoided comparable destruction at home but built short-term growth on unsustainable state spending; growth is now projected to fall from 3.4% (2024) to roughly 1% (2025-26). Both face inflation and high interest rates for different reasons — Ukraine from wartime scarcity and currency depreciation, Russia from an overheated economy now cooling. Sanctions have constrained but not crippled Russia, which adapted via shadow shipping and Asian trade reorientation and still holds significant reserves, albeit partly frozen abroad; Ukraine, by contrast, survives on external financing with no comparable domestic cushion, while losing roughly a third of its pre-war population to displacement. CONCLUSION Both economies show strain from prolonged war, in different registers. Ukraine's modest 2-3% growth coexists with enormous reconstruction needs and deep aid dependency. Russia's wartime growth spurt has ended, replaced by near-stagnation, above-target inflation, falling energy revenue, and rising taxes. Neither trajectory is stable long-term, and outcomes for both will hinge heavily on how and when the war ends.